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Abstract. Introduction. Sweden and Finland obtain a special position within NATO strategy towards neutral
states. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the background and perspectives for Sweden and Finland to join
NATO in the 1990s – 2000s. This issue appeared on the top of agenda after these countries had entered the EU, and
right after the Baltic states became members of NATO.
Finland started to distant itself from Russia in 1990-1992, right after recognizing itself free from military and
technical limitations set in the Peace treaty signed in 1947 and gaining an ability to arrange political and military
alliances with other countries. Joining the Alliance has first appeared on the Finnish political agenda in the first
half of the 1990s, though the political elite of Finland defining its practical relations with NATO also took into
consideration the position of Russia since both countries had a long joint terrestrial border and close economic
relations. Sweden started revising its foreign policy vector in 1991. The governing elite had an active discussion
which ended with a compromise decision on preserving the neutral status of the country alongside with enforcing
its defensive capacities.
Since 1992, Finland and Sweden became participants of various agreements with NATO. Their armed forces
and armaments systems have adopted the NATO standards, and have been working out their practical interaction
during the joint military maneuvers and within Partnership for Peace program. In 2009 Nordic defense cooperation
emerged, including three NATO participants – Iceland, Norway and Denmark. In April 2014 they signed an agreement
on close military cooperation.
Results. We can state without any doubt that Finland and Sweden would join NATO only when they
face a real threat towards themselves. Russian policy in the region can be a trigger for that. After  Crimea
annexed Russia, the amount of advocates of joining NATO increased. Nevertheless, they still remain a minority.
In this situation a referendum on joining NATO appears to have no perspectives. On the contrary, we should
mark that both countries became involved into “crawling” integration into NATO structures: alongside with
official Partnership for Peace program it takes place in the official European integration institutions. After
joining the EU in 1995 Sweden and Finland are obliged to obey the joint European security and foreign
policies, i.e. arranging their military and foreign policies with basic principles and directives developed jointly
with other EU members, who are also participants of NATO. Thus, neutrality of these two states becomes a
phantom, especially towards Russia.
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Аннотация. В статье авторами затрагивается проблема взаимоотношений НАТО и нейтральных госу-
дарств Северной Европы (Швеции и Финляндии) в 1990–2000-е гг., которая исследуется в контексте евроатлан-
тической безопасности. В работе подчеркивается, что Финляндия и Швеция обладают весьма высоким рей-
тингом стратегической привлекательности для НАТО. Впервые дается систематизация этапов эволюции вза-
имоотношений Организации Североатлантического договора и внеблоковых стран Северной Европы, рас-
сматриваются тенденции сотрудничества между ними, а также предпосылки, перспективы и возможные
последствия членства Швеции и Финляндии в НАТО. Большое внимание уделяется эволюции нейтралитета
этих стран в сторону его большей ограниченности в условиях вхождения обеих стран в Европейский союз.
С.Ю. Болдыревой проанализирована эволюция финского нейтралитета в 1990–2000-е гг., изменение
характера взаимоотношений Финляндии c Россией и Североатлантическим альянсом. Р.Ю. Болдыревым дан
анализ шведской внешней политики на атлантическом и балтийском направлении, раскрыты причины, этапы
и особенности сближения Швеции с НАТО.
Ключевые слова: нейтралитет, политика неприсоединения, «финляндизация», превентивная диплома-
тия, НАТО, ЕС.
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Introduction. Two Nordic countries played
a special role in the mechanism of NATO
interaction with neutral countries: Sweden and
Finland. Both states have a very important military
and strategic position: Sweden stretches along the
most part of the Baltic Sea western shores,
connecting territories of Denmark and Norway,
controlling the straight leading from Baltic Sea to
Northern Sea; Finland stretches on 1265 km from
the south to the north along the Russian border
controlling the northern shore of the Gulf of
Finland. Without the member status in NATO both
states have always been extremely active in
collaboration within Alliance activities, being de-
facto its outpost on the northern borders of Russia.
The purpose of the paper is to analyze the
background and perspectives of merging Sweden
and Finland into NATO in the 1990s – 2000s. The
issue of admitting Sweden and Finland into the
Alliance appeared on the top of the agenda after
both states had entered the European Union in
1995 and acceptance of the neighboring Baltic
states into NATO in 2004. As a result, firstly,
Sweden and Finland became surrounded by
territories of  NATO member states on three from
four sides; secondly, general security and foreign
policies of the EU were integrated into the united
defensive system of the European allies of the
USA and Canada.
There is a common opinion in Russian
political thought that “the main stability condition
in the North of Europe is a non-participation policy
of Sweden and Finland in the military alliances”
[5, p. 71]. Such position limits approach towards
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an objective analysis of Swedish and Finnish
policy in this aspect. Over the last years, especially
after Crimea annexed Russia, a vast number of
critical publications on the possible integration of
Sweden and Finland into NATO has appeared in
Russian media. Nevertheless, in general the issue
of perspective merging of Sweden and Finland
into NATO remains a subject to discussion that
makes this paper relevant.
Discussion. Discussion on the admission of
Sweden and Finland into NATO began in the 1990s.
After reunification of Germany in the autumn of
1990 Finnish government declared that the articles
of peace treaty signed in 1947 on the obligations of
Finland in repelling the German aggression have
ceased to be in force. Besides, Finland stopped to
consider itself limited by military and technical
limitations outcoming from the treaty. On January
20, 1992 Russian Federation and Finland signed a
treaty replacing the treaty on friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance between Finland
and the USSR from April 6, 1948 [23]. According
to a new agreement, Finland does not have any
obstacles to conclude political or military alliances
with the third parties [14, p. 206]. Afterwards it
turned clear, which third party it appears to be:
already in May 1992 Finnish Prime Minister  Esko
Aho in his speech made an accent on the historical
significance of NATO as a guarantor of security
for Denmark and Norway [8, p. 360].
Nevertheless, an official position of these
countries towards the Alliance remains based on
the non-alignment policy towards military blocs
due to geopolitical factors: firstly, due to territorial
proximity, and, as a result, special sensitivity
towards the position of Russia.
Analysis. Closure of Swedish and Finnish
interests also became possible due to a task of
NATO to reconcile crisis cases and to develop
partnership networks with other countries. It
correlated with the main tasks of foreign policy
of Finland and Sweden, which paid significant
attention to preventive diplomacy. In 1992 both
countries joined the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council as the observers, which later evolved into
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and also
entered the Partnership for Peace programme
[15]. Finland and Sweden took part in the
operation of NATO contingent operation in
compliance with the Dayton agreements on
Bosnia, later replaced by SFOR1. Both countries
also contributed to involvement of Russia and the
Baltic states into “Partnership for Peace”
framework activities. On the contrary to Sweden,
Finland lobbies interests of  Russia more actively,
in the aforementioned programme framework in
particular, being more interested in stable relations
with its eastern neighbor.
With formation of the government under
Carl Bildt chairmanship in 1991 a purpose for
revision of Swedish foreign policy became a
subject for discussion: a question of preserving
the traditional neutrality in foreign policy appeared
in agenda. Carl Bildt himself alongside with ruling
Christian Democratic party (Kristdemokraterna)
and the People’s party – Liberals
(Folkpartietbiberalerna) supposed, that the country
should abandon its neutral status. As a main
argument stated by defense minister Anders
Björck was an issue of supporting the defense
capacity of Sweden in conditions of governmental
course aimed to decline the military expenses [12].
A compromise reached in the late 1990s
inside Swedish political elite was expressed in
“preserving the principle of non-alignment of the
country to military alliances with a purpose to
provide it with a possibility to keep its neutrality in
case of a war breakout” [10]. In the end of 1995
Riksdag confirmed that neutrality and high
defense capacity are set in stone principles of
Swedish foreign policy. New foreign affairs
minister Anna Lindh during her speech in the
Swedish institute of international relations stated
that neutrality of the country still assists in
achieving security in the Baltic sea area.
Nevertheless, Swedish armed forces
cooperate with NATO actively, participating in
joint military exercises and military operations. We
should also take into consideration an economic
aspect: Swedish army requires significant
financing, covering 1,7 % GDP of the country.
Due to that, numerous Swedish politicians consider
NATO membership as a possibility to solve
defense capacity financial issues.
A special role of Sweden in relationship with
NATO appears in the form of Nordic defense
cooperation, created in 2009 and including
Denmark, Iceland and Norway alongside with
Sweden and Finland. Without NATO membership
Sweden provides Nordic defense cooperation
members with armament supplies and also
participates in reforming armed forces of these
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states according to NATO standards. In 2014
Sweden criticized merging Crimea into Russia and
joined the anti-Russian sanctions. In April 2014
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland
have signed a document on tense military
cooperation. Some of analysts have called it ‘An
Atlantic mini-NATO’. Sweden and Finland have
simultaneously launched remilitarization of Gotland 2
and Åland islands 3. Numerous politicians connect
the decision with Ukrainian crisis and Crimea
annexing. In May 2016 Sweden ratified a
cooperation agreement with NATO allowing its
troops to participate in exercises taking place on
Swedish territory. Furthermore, in case war breaks
out in the region, Swedes will permit NATO to set
up military bases on their territory.
In Finland discussion on joining NATO
appeared in political agenda in the end of the 1980s.
The fact can be connected, firstly, with an issue of
positioning the country in Europe after the collapse
of the USSR and new identity search [17]. The
number of NATO partnership advocates is rather
low, though arguments regarding that are active.
A motive for that was a NATO expansion towards
east, which started in the 1990s and was connected
with the reunification of Germany and downfall of
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.
One of the most active advocates of Finnish NATO
membership is, for example, a well-known Finnish
diplomat and political observer Max Jacobson, who
supposed that accession of Poland, Czechia and
Hungary to NATO in 1999 changed the balance of
powers in Europe and led to revision of Swedish
and Finnish neutrality [19]. He also states that Finns
are unsettled by worsening relations with Russia
due to including Baltic region countries into NATO
and breaking stability in Northern Europe.
According to his opinion, Russia is interested in
preserving its domination in the Baltic area in any
case, despite any possible position towards
accession to NATO in Sweden and Finland.
Therefore, it is irrational to set a position of Finland
into a dependence on possible reaction of the
country, which cannot be influenced by Russian
government. Moreover, “if NATO remains a
European security guarantor, neutrality of Sweden
and Finland sets them into a status of secondary
players in accepting the decisions on European
security” [7].
Nevertheless, despite the discussion on
NATO accession in Finnish society, a
governmental official course remains unchanged:
Finland still does not join any military and political
blocs, NATO membership is considered only as a
remote perspective. In a governmental report
“Security in changing world” published in 1995 it
was stated that “Finland will continue its non-
alignment policy towards military alliances within
changes occurring in Europe. Finland managed
to create a reliable defensive capacities with an
international recognition basing on its own
resources” [21]. Military leaders constantly
underline that defense capacities of the country
is the most reliable guarantor of avoiding war,
despite a character of any crisis occurring [21].
Alignment to NATO is not a recognized need
since most of Finnish politicians suppose that the
country does not need any security guarantees
from the alliance. On the contrary, alignment of
Finland to NATO could have changed the situation
with jeopardizing stability in the region.
There is a small-numbered group of
politicians in Finland, who are advocates of
alignment to NATO. Originally it used to be a
small “Young Finns” party (Nuorsuomalaiset)
under leadership of Risto Pentilä. Besides them,
former head of the EU military committee and
also Finnish defense minister general Gustav
Hägglund also actively supported alignment of
Finland to NATO [15]. In 2004 he even
presented an idea of turning the joint EU defense
policy into “a European base” of NATO. In that
case the “American base” of NATO could be
involved into worldwide operations against
terrorism, and the “European base” could
participate in a crisis management in the
region [5]. A Finnish Scholar Kristen Pursiainen
has presented an interesting statement. Alignment
of Finland to NATO is required due to “an
indirect support of an idea, that EU and Russia
are enemies” finding advocates in the country
despite its neutral status. According to his
opinion, NATO membership of Finland could give
the country new possibilities of integrating Russia
into western institutions: “Without NATO
membership, Finland also remains outside
developing relations between NATO and Russia,
and thus cannot influence on a vast number of
factors directly connected with its security” [5].
Nevertheless, an official position of Helsinki is
based on the non-alignment policy towards
military alliances.
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A well-known Finnish politician, one of
participants of President elections in 2018 Matti
Vanhanen greeted the partnership with NATO
alongside with discussion on tense cooperation of
Finland and NATO, but he stated that it will not
lead to joining the alliance [13]. President of
Finland Sauli Niinistö alongside with a former
foreign affairs minister Alexander Stubb actively
promote the idea of alignment to NATO.
Alexander Stubb in one of his interviews in 2014
stated: “Despite the fact, that I am an advocate
of NATO membership for my country, I am not
sure that it is the moment for it. We should also
consider, that only 25 % of Finns agree with it” [6].
President of Finland Sauli Niinistö supposes that
the best moment for joining NATO was in the
beginning of the 1990s, but it was lost. At the same
moment, Foreign minister of Finland in 2011-2015
Erkki Tuomioja has given an equivocal assessment
to perspectives of joining NATO: “As it is stated
in governmental programme, Finland is not a
member of the Alliance, but cooperates with
NATO and preserves a possibility to apply for a
membership” [3].
Advocates of  NATO membership name the
following reasons for it: firstly, it is security of the
country, thus even with losing some part of its
sovereignty it is more acceptable to look for a
protection from a stronger political player.
According to the opinion of numerous Finns,
terrorism and imperial ambitions of Russia
jeopardize the international security. Secondly,
NATO membership can increase status and
significance of the country. Though the authors
of collective monograph “Northern Europe – a
region of new development” suppose that on the
contrary, NATO expansion with alignment of
Sweden and Finland can have their role in EU
institutions decrease dramatically. Also, a regional
and sub-regional cooperation frameworks can
suffer, mostly with Russia [4, pp. 418-440].
The political establishment of Finland also
has people criticizing the possible NATO
membership, who supposes that it can turn the
country into a comfortable staging ground for
military infrastructure in a close proximity to
Russian borders. Numerous Finnish politicians
state that the organization wants the countries
without membership to participate in crisis
operations more actively alongside with
accompanying decision-making procedures, so it
could help the alliance to acquire more soldiers
for complicated missions. A former ambassador
of Finland in Russia Heikki Talvitie stated that
NATO membership could have not enforce
security of Finland, because the western powers
are not interested in defending the Finnish territory.
A hypothetic amount of assistance provided from
NATO and preparedness of its members to send
it are up in the air. Therefore for Finland it could
be a careless step to initiate a confrontation with
Russia having such dubious guarantees from
NATO. Heikki Talvite did not doubt in a profit
from NATO membership to Finland, but warned
against forcing the process and complicating the
situation on Russian border at the time [20].
Meanwhile Finland appears to be prepared
for NATO membership: armed forces and
armament systems are reformed according to
NATO standards, practical interaction skills
increased during the joint military exercises and
Partnership for Peace programme. Finland
ordered from the USA various types of missiles
and supplementary hardware for them costing
$277 million overall, willing to confirm its positive
relations with alliance [3]. Admiral Juhani
Kaskeala stated that Finnish army is absolutely
prepared to join NATO. This statement of former
commander in chief in 2001-2009 confirms that
non-alignment to military blocs does not mean that
the country will remain neutral [23].
When conducting its foreign and defense
policies, both states base on a purpose to support
its relations with NATO in order to support stability
in Baltic sea area: “NATO is the only international
organization, which is able to maintain crisis
management requiring military intervention and
military operations and pacification by force
operations”, and “expansion of… NATO has
increased the security level in territories, which
are in a proximity from Finland” [1]. Numerous
Swedish politicians underline that there is no
European power to dominate in Northern Europe,
and the US presence appears to be a
counterweight towards such possibility. Also both
countries greet various “non-military” cooperation
within NATO like minimizing harm towards
ecological balance caused by military activities,
holding the peacekeeping operations and
emergency recovery [17]. “Partnership for
peace” programme obtains a special status having
a cooperation core in “increasing the operative
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compatibility of the armed forces of the
participating countries with a purpose to establish
successful operative frameworks” [16]. It is
crucial to underline the fact, that operations
coordinated by the Alliance with participation of
the partner countries are recognized as primary
in European crisis management, though the EU
and its joint foreign policy and CFSP 4 also remain
a crucial instrument in security policy.
Transatlantic solidarity support grew
especially in the beginning of the 2000s in Sweden
and Finland after the events of September 11,
2001. Finnish and Swedish foreign ministers have
announced: “If an EU member state subjects to
terrorist attack, both Sweden and Finland will
provide any relevant assistance” [9]. Both
countries  have also made practical steps in this
area, offering to improve the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council functions to reply the threat.
Nevertheless, Helsinki and Stockholm do not
suppose any alternative of NATO to be
established in order to hold anti-terrorist activities.
We can be sure that Finland and Sweden join
NATO only when they face a real jeopardy, not a
mythic one. In the beginning of the 1990s Swedish
foreign minister Margaretha af Ugglas stated that
non-alignment policy is a mean, not a final aim [18].
This is a final point since Swedish politicians have
not make any step further yet. Despite the statements
from conservatives in Moderate coalitional party
(Moderatasamlingspartiet) and Liberal party
(Liberalerna) supporting the alignment of Sweden
to NATO, the government holds its own line.
Social democrat Erkki Tuomioja who
occupied foreign minister position between 2011
and 2015 states that Finland should increase its
military cooperation with Sweden. One of
cooperation issues is unification of air and maritime
defense of both countries [2]. Numerous
politicians of Sweden and Finland announce openly
that military cooperation of both countries is a main
priority in defense policy for them. Though it is
careless to speak about a new military bloc, but
Swedish – Finnish interaction can definitely lead
to creating an treaty-based alliance.
A Russian policy in the region can trigger
this process. Swedish commander in chief, general
Micael Byden 5 has openly stated that possibility
to launch a conflict between NATO and Russia
in the Baltic sea area increased. During his visit
to Lithuania he emphasizes that arrival of NATO
military equipment to the region at the moment,
when Russia demonstrates its wish to use military
forces for achieving political objectives increases
the risks of conflict and provocations [2].
Swedish defense ministry studies the legal
aftermath of signing this kind of treaty with Finland
at the moment. This attempt to create a de-jure
military bloc has gained political support in both
states. So, an ex-defense minister of Finland Matti
Vanhanen is sure, that creating an alliance can
turn into a main component of establishing a state
security of both countries on a higher level:
“I support this point of view, according to which
we should be extremely careful in war and peace
issues. We cannot be sure, that in emergency case
we can receive resources from our neighbor, if
we still recognize a cooperation with Sweden as
a voluntary one. A defensive alliance between two
countries cannot be in force functionally or even
possible, unless we make our joint foreign policy.
Only in this case a true alliance of two national
states can be put into force” [2]. A bilateral
agreement and a defensive alliance could make
grounds for overcoming various indefinite
situations in the future and also define joint
resource application frameworks, according to his
opinion.
Allan Widman, chairman of Swedish
Riksdag defense committee supposes that the
Swedish government should at first clarify the
long-lasting perspective of Swedish-Finnish
cooperation. The party, where he is a member,
the Liberal party (Liberalerna) in general supports
the creating of legally formed military alliance,
recognizing it as the first step towards possible
NATO membership. The Moderate coalitional
party (Moderatasamlingspartiet) also supports this
initiative, also requiring the Swedish government
to create a road map of Swedish alignment to
NATO. The Moderaterna suppose, that those
amendments, which were offered to be made in
the Treaty between Sweden and NATO in 2014
still leave the kingdom isolated, unprotected and
lacking the defense guarantees from NATO, that
the Alliance provides any assistance. The Treaty
allowed NATO to relocate troops through the
Swedish territory, but only when peace is in force.
An emphasis is set there on participation of
NATO forces in exercises hosted in Sweden. At
the moment, Sweden is considering amendments
to the document, which could allow the NATO
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forces to relocate through Swedish territory not
only within peaceful case, but also during the
armed conflict situation.
Nevertheless 2/3 of citizens in Finland and
Sweden suppose that both countries should solve
their defense issues on their own. At the same
time, 1/4 of respondents are advocates of joint
policy in defense issues [3]. According to the
opinion of Swedish experts, grounds of such
phenomenon are not connected with doubting
towards position of Finland, but in skepticism
towards any military alliance in general. It can
also refer to Finland as well.
This conclusion is circumstantially confirmed
with an attitude towards NATO. More than a half
of survey participants are convicted that
cooperation with NATO should not be extended.
Almost the same number of respondents have
such attitude in Sweden. 40 % of respondents
support enforcing the cooperation between NATO
and their country [3]. Sociologists noticed that the
number of NATO alignment advocates grew after
Crimea had merged Russia, though still remaining
a minority. The Atlantists appear predominantly
within some separate parties or as a “private
opinion”. A Center party (Centerpartiet) offers
to revise the national neutrality. Nevertheless, the
political elite of both countries shows a reserved
position in this case.
In case Finland and Sweden having a high
level of military preparedness align to NATO, it
changes the military and political balance in the
Baltic region in particular, and in whole Northern
Europe in general. The contact line between
NATO and Russia in this case lasts through the
whole Northern Europe from the Barents Sea to
Pskov and Kaliningrad [23].
It should force Russia to develop several
scenarios of its policy towards Baltic states and
NATO, to plan the issue of guarantees of its own
security, also on a mutually beneficial basis for
the whole region [22]. It can be traced via regular
joint state visits of presidents of Russia and
Finland. When considering the Baltic states
alignment to NATO, and its proximity to Saint
Petersburg, we come to a conclusion that the
Finnish factor becomes a decisive one for
providing the security of Northwestern Russia,
for a free exit from the Gulf of Finland, for
connection with the Kaliningrad region and the
Atlantic ocean without obstacles and for gas
delivery lines construction on the bottom of the
Baltic sea.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin
commented a possible alignment to NATO of one
of the neighbours of the country – Finland:
“In various political and social groups of Finland
this issue appears from time to time. Our attitude
towards extending the military and political
alliances in general, and towards NATO in
particular is well-known, and we do not think that
it will assist in supporting the security level in the
world. Finland is a full member of the Western
community, and an EU member. Approaching the
NATO infrastructure to Russian borders via
Finland will not assist in improving relations
between our countries. But the main thing is that
the contemporary threats are mainly in struggle
against terror, drug traffic, human trade, organized
criminal, mass destruction weapon and delivery
means dissemination. These problems can be
solved only with joint efforts an on a bloc-free
basis. As far as I know, the Finnish government
supports this point of view. Nevertheless, the final
decision is in the hands of the Finnish people, and
Finnish government” [11].
An ex-prime minister of Finland, and also a
candidate during the presidential elections in 2018,
Matti Vanhanen supposes that alignment of Finland
to NATO could be a “genuine choice”, even
despite the fact of increasing the risks for Russia.
According to his opinion, interest of Finland
towards NATO membership was provoked by
actions taken by Russia and its aggressive conduct
in the region. Present-day foreign minister of
Finland Timo Soini emphasizes a crucial character
of joing security policy for the EU, but a possibility
to join NATO at any moment should become a
background for the country.
Results. Thus, attitudes of Sweden and
Finland towards NATO base on three
opportunities: the first one is a military non-
alignment as an option, which can be also
abandoned in a future. The second, when Helsinki
and Stockholm show their will to involve into
planning and implementing decisions where it is
possible in a maximum level of their abilities. The
main difference between positions of these two
countries is that Finland is actively attempting to
involve Russia into joint military exercises within
NATO vector. Also Finland is a more active
initiator and participant of various NATO
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programmes. It is connected with position of
Sweden as an independent player between major
powers, while Finland recognized itself as a small
country in the Baltic sea region, whose position
had a disrespectful label of “Finlandization”.
Thirdly, these Northern European countries
constantly emphasize the importance of crisis
management and preventive diplomacy as a
counterweight towards direct military force of
NATO.
At the moment, holding a referendum with
alignment to NATO as a subject has no
perspectives since the majority of population will
vote against this decision. Also putting their armies
to NATO standards will cause the increase of
expenditures, which can also gain a negative reply.
We should also consider that both counties
became involved into “creeping” NATO
integration: it takes place via both official
Partnership for Peace programme and official
European institutions. Becoming EU members in
1995, Sweden and Finland have obligations to
follow the joint European security and foreign
policies via arranging their military and foreign
policy vectors with basic principles and joining
directives developed in a partnership with other
EU members, who are also simultaneously NATO
members. It means, that the neutrality of both
Nordic countries becomes a phantom, especially
towards the Russian Federation.
NOTES
1 Stabilization Force. According to Dayton
agreements signed on 21 November 1995 a NATO
military contingent entered the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina – Implementation Force (IFOR). SFOR
mission was established according to the UN Security
Council resolution No. 1088 of 12 November 1996 as a
mission-successor of IFOR.
2 Between 2005 and 2016 regular troops were
not stationed on the Gotland island. In September 2016
a military exercise took place there with the participation
of 150 soldiers of mounted infantry, who have received
an order to be stationed there on a regular basis.
3 According to Еland Convention of 1921 signed
by ten states (Sweden, Finland, Germany, Great Britain,
France, Italy, Denmark, Poland, Estonia and Latvia)
and ratified by the League of Nations, Еland islands
are totally neutralized and demilitarized zone – no
military units can be stationed there, and no military
fortifications can be established.
4 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
5 Commander in chief of Swedish armed forces
(Swedish: Цverbefдlhavaren) is the highest rank officer
in Swedish military hierarchy, according to NATO
terms, this position is an equivalent to Swedish chief
of defense term.
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